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THE CANADIAN OUTSIDE DIRECTOR: GREAT
EXPECTATIONS
Warren Grover*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Final Report of the Joint Committee on Corporate Gover-
nance,' following the Dey Report,2 recommended that the Canada
Business Corporations Act (CBCA) should be amended to make it
clear that directors do not need to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation, as the CBCA used to provide, but should be
responsible to supervise the management of the business and affairs
of the corporation, which is now the wording of the relevant provi-
sion in the CBCA. 3 The Saucier Report then went on to identify the
five core functions that the board of directors should be explicitly
responsible for:
(1) Choosing the chief executive officer and ensuring that
the senior management team can successfully manage the
corporation.
(2) Setting the parameters within which the management team
operates.
(3) Coaching the management team.
(4) Monitoring the performance of the CEO and setting the
CEO's compensation.(5) Providing assurance to stakeholders of the integrity of the
reported financial performance.
* Falconbridge Professor in Commercial Law at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto and
partner emeritus at Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP. This is the revised version of
comments on Chris Nicholls' paper 'The Outside Director: Policeman or Policebo?"
delivered at the 32nd Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, held at the
Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto on October 18 and 19, 2002. The revised
version of the Nicholls paper precedes this article.
1. Joint Committee on Corporate Governance, Final Report, Beyond Compliance: Building
a Corporate Governance Culture (TSX, CICA, November 2001) (hereafter Saucier Re-
port).
2. 1994 Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada entitled
"Where Were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada".
3. Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 102(1).
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According to the Saucier Report, boards must have the capacity,
independent of management, to fulfil these responsibilities. To
accomplish this, boards need strong members independent of man-
agement with an appropriately diverse set of skills. These directors
are defined as "outside directors".
In this article I will assume that such individuals can be found
in sufficient abundance to fill the majority of the seats on the
boards of Canadian corporations traded on the Toronto Stock Ex-
change (TSE), as mandated by the Saucier Report. I will comment
on five concepts that I consider most important, namely disclosure,
liability, the audit committee, remuneration and insider trading. Be-
fore proceeding with those five matters I touch on two concepts that
I believe drive Canadian considerations of these problems.
The first concept is that it is generally agreed that publicly
traded Canadian corporations are mainly controlled by one person
or a small group of persons. In 1991 Ron Daniels and Jeffrey
Macintosh stated that only 14% of the companies listed on the TSE
300 were widely held; 60.3% were controlled by a single share-
holder or group of shareholders with legal control and 25.4% were
controlled by a single shareholder or group of shareholders with
effective control. This contrasts with the Fortune 500 where 63%
were widely held.' At a rhetorical level, when considering directors'
duties of loyalty and care, Ed Iacobucci opines that "negligence
seems unlikely, but violations of the fiduciary duty do not, where
there is a controlling shareholder".6 On the other hand Daniels and
Ed Waitzer stated that "the long-standing American concern with
shareholder capacity to discipline managers for self-indulgent con-
duct is less relevant in a Canadian setting".7 Whatever the theory,
the CBCA says that shareholders elect the board of directors8 and
4. Saucier Report, supra, footnote i, at p. 5.
5. R. Daniels and J. Maclntosh, "Towards A Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime"
(1991), 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 863, repeated in R. Daniels and E. Waitzer, "Challenges to
the Citadel: A Brief Overview of Recent Trends in Canadian Corporate Governance"
(1994), 23 C.B.L.J. 23 at p. 26. See also E. Iacobucci, "A Wise Decision? An Analysis of
the Relationship Between Corporate Ownership Structure and Directors' and Officers'
Duties" (2002), 36 C.B.L.J. 337 at p. 356.
6. lacobucci, ibid., at p. 367.
7. Daniels and Waitzer, supra, footnote 5, at p. 26. Put another way, a controlling share-
holder will make sure management takes care of the majority shareholder and therefore
the conflict is fairness between controlling and minority shareholders, not accountability
of the management to shareholders generally.
8. CBCA, S. 106(3).
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shareholders, by a simple majority, may remove any director.' Con-
trolling the board of directors implies control of officers, since
directors appoint the officers." Coupled with this concept of concen-
trated control is an abundance of subordinate voting shares" so that
the controlling group may, in fact, have a relatively small percentage
of the market capital.' 2 Subordinated voting shares impact the ability
to oust inefficient management. 3
The second phenomenon that I believe exists, but is harder to
prove, is that Canadian regulators make a lot of rules but seldom
appear able to enforce them. Making the rules will likely result in
a majority of those affected obeying the rules, although excessive
speeding on Ontario highways seems to be the norm, in sharp
contrast to jurisdictions where effective enforcement is practised.
The CBCA provides that every person who contravenes its provisions
or regulations for which no punishment is provided is guilty of an
offence punishable on summary conviction.' 4 Similarly a person
who makes an untrue statement of a material fact in any document
required by the Act or regulations to be sent to the director or any
other person is liable to a fine or imprisonment. 5 No attempt to
enforce these sections has ever been made. The lack of effective
enforcement by the Securities Commissions is also apparent, as the
Livent, Bre-X and YBM scandals demonstrated. Insider trading is not
9. CBCA, s. 109(1). Note that s. 6(4) does not allow for a greater number of votes to be put
in the articles of incorporation.
10. CBCA, s. 121 - Often the controlling shareholder is herself the chief executive officer
and may well pass the position down to the next generation when the controlling
shareholder retires. For example, Belinda Stronach has succeeded her father, Frank, as
head of Magna International Inc. and Edward Rogers Jr. will now head the cable
company named after his father. It is not clear if provincial securities law can require
independent directors in light of the clear provision of the CBCA, as the selection of
directors is corporate law and not related to buying and selling of securities: see Multiple
Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon (1982), 138 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [19821 2 S.C.R. 161.
11. The Toronto Stock Exchange differentiates multiple voting, subordinate voting, re-
stricted voting and non-voting.
12. For example, Rogers Communications Inc. has about three times as many non-voting as
voting shares whereas at Magna International Inc. the ratio of subordinate voting to
voting shares is about 80:1.
13. See for example, Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp. (1998), 113
O.A.C. 253, 42 O.R. (3d) 177 sub nom. Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp.
(C.A.); Bowater Canadian Ltd. v. R.L Crain Ltd. (1988), 62 O.R. (2d) 752, 46 D.L.R.
(4th) 161 (C.A.).
14. CBCA, s. 251.
15. CBCA, s. 250.
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dealt with effectively by either the regulators 6 or through civil
actions. 7
II. DISCLOSURE
One of the key corporate functions where an outside director
can assist both management and stakeholders is by trying to ensure
that all disclosure by the corporation reflects good communication
skills. Disclosure is seen as an essential touchstone of appropriate
corporate governance."8 Yet the concept of how to disclose as op-
posed to what to disclose is seldom discussed, other than to say
disclosure must be "full, true and plain". 9 It is at least arguable that
the present disclosure by corporations is inadequate as a meaningful
communication to shareholders. The ability of most investors to
read and understand the financial statements is scant, yet such state-
ments are a mainstay of corporate disclosure.2" In order to enhance
investor understanding of the issuer's business the regulators have
required the issuers to provide a supplemental disclosure known as
the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) to accompany
16. The recent criminal fine paid by way of plea bargain by Michael Cowpland and the
subsequent Ontario Securities Commission decision, In the Matter of M.C.J.C. Holdings
Inc. and Michael Cowpland, Feb. 12, 2002, are much in point.
17. Green v. Charterhouse Group Canada Ltd. (1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 161, [1973] 2 O.R.
677, affd 68 D.L.R. (3d) 592, 12 O.R. (2d) 280 (C.A.); McIntyre Porcupine Mines Ltd.
v. Hammond (1975), 119 D.L.R. (3d) 139,31 O.R. (2d) 452 (H.C.J.) (U.S. statute of no
effect in Canada); Bell v. Source Data ControlLtd. (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 580,66 O.R.
(2d) 78 (C.A.); Dusik v. Newton (1983), 1 D.L.R. (4th) 568, 48 B.C.LR. Il1 (C.A.).
One of the few successful civil prosecutions was Tongue v. Vencap Equities Alberta Ltd.,
[1996] 6 W.W.R. 761, 39 Alta. L.R. (3d) 29 (C.A.), which was a suit under the CBCA,
not the securities legislation. There is also a successful civil suit under the Alberta
Securities Act, Nir Oil Ltd. v. Bodrug (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 608, 38 Alta. L.R. (2d)
321 (C.A.), and a partial victory in British Columbia, Pelling v. Pelling (1981), 130
D.L.R. (3d) 761, [1982] 2 W.W.R. 185 (B.C.S.C.).
18. osc Staff Notice 51-703 (June 16, 2000) says "The quality and timeliness of information
disclosed to the capital markets by reporting issuers pursuant to the continuous disclo-
sure obligations has always been a focus of the osc".
19. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, s. 56, is an example.
20. The Saucier Report, supra, footnote 1, says the directors should provide assurance to
stakeholders about the integrity of the corporation's reported financial performance. osc
Rule 52-501 (December 15, 2000) sets out the requirements for financial disclosure of
issuers and adds some osc requirements in addition to Canadian Generally Accepted
Accounting Practice (GAAP). It is interesting that the additional osc requirements relate
to balance sheet items and comparative statements. Quarterly statements are not required
to be audited but Companion Policy 52-501 CP item 2.1 sets out the osc view that an
external auditor should carry out a review of such statements.
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both annual financial statements and quarterly financial statements."
It is difficult to believe that these turgid disclosures add to any
investor's understanding.
For example, in the Coca-Cola Company 2001 Annual Report,
the Financial Review Incorporating Management's Discussion and
Analysis runs for 20 pages and precedes the five pages of financial
statements and the 20 pages of notes to the financial statements.
The MD&A contains such informative disclosure as:
Our international operations are subject to certain opportunities and risks,
including currency fluctuations and government actions. We closely monitor
our operations in each country and seek to adopt appropriate strategies that
are responsive to changing economic and political environments and to fluctu-
ations in foreign currencies.22
There is a much more upbeat, user-friendly part of the Report
in the Coca-Cola Chairman's remarks headed "Dear fellow share
owners", which supplies the important data in four readily readable
pages. The dichotomy between the positive communication in the
Chairman's remarks and the miscommunication in the MD&A
shows the impact regulatory rules have on useful disclosure. This
impact is further exacerbated by the rules relating to financial disclo-
sure.23 The recent problems with Enron and its Special Purpose
Vehicles (sPy) has resulted in a complex set of rules, designed by
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) in Canada
but following the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
rules in the United States, relating to asset securitization.
Asset securitization is a simple concept but may be difficult for
a corporation seeking financial assistance to achieve. Often asset
securitization is used with respect to accounts receivable, which
traditionally were pledged or assigned to a bank as security for a
loan.24 Such a loan would be shown on the balance sheet as a
liability. Under an asset securitization transaction, the accounts re-
ceivable of the corporation (the Originator) are sold to a third party
constructed for the purpose and known as a Special Purpose Entity
21. osc Rule 51-501. The extension to quarterly statements started in 2001. The audit
committee, which is composed of outside directors, in the Commission's view, should
carefully review and consider the MD&A - osc 51-501 CP item 2.4.
22. Coca-Cola 2001 Annual Report, p. 53. I used Coca Cola just to indicate that disclosure
in the United States is as arcane as in Canada.
23. Found in s. 5-2 of the osc Rules, which occupies over 30 pages in the compilation by
Thomson Carswell, 33rd ed.
24. D. Sullivan, "Current Methods of Corporate Financing", 1974 Corp. Man. Tax Conf. 1.
13-38 C.B.L.J.
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(sPE) or sPV. That sPv in turn raises funds based only on the strength
of the assets sold. Normally the Originator continues to service the
accounts receivable, with the result that the financial transaction is
opaque to the customers whose accounts have been sold.25 The result
of the sale, in terms of the balance sheet, is to show a diminution in
accounts receivable and an increase in cash, with no provision in the
liabilities section. This is a very positive financial advantage for the
Originator, and if the SPV is owned largely by a bank or its subsidiar-
ies then the bank will not have increased its loan portfolio, which is
a positive result from the bank's perspective. But the essence of the
transaction requires a "true sale" of the assets securitized. It is to
that essence that the CICA has promulgated a set of rules that are
difficult for all but the cognoscenti to comprehend.26
There is an interesting case recently decided by an Ontario court
in an action against BC Tel by several major financial institutions
including SunLife.27 The facts of the case show the many benefits
sPvs may bring. The undisputed facts are that in 1985 BC Tel issued
a series of 11.35% bonds with a 2005 maturity date. These bonds
contained what was then a standard no financial advantage clause
(NFAC) that provided that BC Tel could not redeem the bonds pursu-
ant to the redemption clause prior to November 2000 by the applica-
tion of funds obtained through borrowings having an interest cost to
the company of less than 11.35% per annum. SunLife bought over
$6 million face value of the bonds between 1991 and 1997 at the
market price, which did not reflect any reduction for the possibility
of early redemption. In October 1997 BC Tel decided to do an
accounts receivable securitization with CIBC as the spy, the proceeds
to be used to redeem the 1985 bonds. The concept that this was a
sale and not a "borrowing" meant that the NFAC did not operate, so
the redemption took place at a value that was approximately $12 per
$100 of bonds redeemed below the then market value. SunLife
alleged that this was simply a borrowing disguised as a sale. The
court found that there was a true sale so the NFAC was not operative
and the bondholders lost money. There was no oppression action
25. The whole concept with respect to accounts receivables is discussed in L. Friedlander,
"Securitization of Divisible Interests: A Canadian Response to Steven Schwarcz"
(1998), 29 C.B.L.J. 323.
26. Draft Guidelines on Consolidation of Special Purpose Entities <www.cica.ca>; the
similar FASB document is found in Exposure Draft June 28, 2002 at <www.fasb.org>.
27. Metropolitan Toronto Police Widows and Orphans Fund v. Telus Communications Inc.,
[20031 O.J. No. 128 (QL), 120 A.C.W.S. (3d) 60 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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available to the bondholders, although clearly their expectations
were ignored by the directors of Telus. Who should have disclosed
the problem to the bondholders?
Given that osC-required disclosure is incomprehensible, will out-
side directors contribute to more effective disclosure to sharehold-
ers, bondholders and other stakeholders? The glut of detailed
requirements put out by the osc and the CICA have resulted in the
MD&A being largely vetted by outside legal counsel while the finan-
cial statements are carefully reviewed by the external auditors. The
directors should get written opinions from both of these profession-
als that they have been prepared in accordance with regulatory
requirements. This is the standard report of the auditor,2" but lawyers
generally shrink from giving a similar opinion regarding the MD&A,
despite the succour this would provide to directors under the CBCA.29
However, the outside directors could be useful in ensuring that
the Chairman's remarks as well as the financial highlights are
helpful to shareholders.'0 While the current regulatory regime is not
conducive to innovative communications concepts, communications
models use both symmetrical and asymmetrical techniques that use
research to develop messages that are likely to persuade strategic
publics to behave as the organization wants.3" Other corporations
use two-way communications models, which can be symmetrical or
asymmetrical. In a two-way symmetrical model the corporation uses
information gained from key relationships such as large institutional
shareholders or analysts to shape the communications programs.32
For example, the corporation may ask analysts whether they want
more focus on current operations or long-term goals. Then the
corporation shapes its communications to reflect that feedback while
still pushing the messages the corporation wants to advance.
The Coca-Cola Company is a very good marketer. In its 2001
Annual Report, Coca-Cola spends the first 35 pages marketing to
its shareholders. In the rest of the report, covering an additional 53
28. Required by s. 169(1) of the CBCA.
29. CBCA, s. 123(4) and (5). For the ability of officers to rely on legal advice, however
erroneous, see Blair v. Consolidated Enfield Corp., [1995] 4 S.C.R. 5, 128 D.L.R. (4th)
73.
30. Page 1 of the Coca-Cola Company 2001 Annual Report, available online at <www.coca-
cola.com>, is a great summary for investors of 2000 and 2001 financial numbers.
31. J. Grunig, "Implications of Public Relations for other Domains of Communication"
(1993), 43 J. of Communications 164.
32. R. Barney and J. Black, "Ethics and Professional Persuasive Communications" (1994),
20 Public Relations Rev. 233.
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pages, is the material required by the regulators - mainly MD&A
plus financial statements. If a system could be developed in which
the directors ensure that the auditors and the outside counsel vet the
regulatory requirements, then the outside directors could concentrate
on the marketing to shareholders, to ensure it was upbeat but not
unrealistic. One hopes the regulators would allow the regulatory
requirements, including MD&A and perhaps the financial statements,
to be posted on the corporate website and not clutter the report to
shareholders.
III. LIABILITY
The current CBCA pattern of monetary liability for outside direc-
tors is relatively clear. Directors are liable to restore to the corpora-
tion amounts they voted to pay out and which were paid out contrary
to various provisions of the Act.33 Similarly directors are responsible
for the issue of shares at an undervalue." They are also liable to
employees for all debts not exceeding six months' wages for services
performed for the corporation while they are directors.35 And direc-
tors are required to comply with the statute, the corporation's con-
stating documents as well as the by-laws.36 This group of potential
liability provisions is erased if the director exercised the care that a
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in the circum-
stances,37 including good faith reliance on financial statements repre-
sented by an officer or reported on by the auditor of the corporation
to fairly reflect the financial condition or the company, and any
other report by a professional person who has expertise in the area.3"
The more general statutory duties of directors are twofold:
(a) to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best
interests of the corporation (the fiduciary duty of loyalty to
the corporation), and
33. CBCA, s. 118(2).
34. CBCA, s. 118(c).
35. CBCA, s. 119;Proulxv. Sahelian Goldfields Inc., [2001] O.J. No. 3728 (QL), 204 D.L.R.
(4th) 670 (C.A.).
36. CBCA, s. 122(2).
37. This duty of care is worded identically to the standard under s. 122(1)(b) discussed
below.
38. CBCA, s. 123(4).
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(b) to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably
prudent person would exercise in the circumstances (the
duty of care).39
Liability under those two provisions will be negated without any
due diligence requirement if the director relied in good faith on
the officer or auditor with respect to financial statements or on a
report of a professional as noted above.'
In addition, corporations may indemnify directors for breaches
of the duty of care4 and may purchase insurance for directors
against any liability incurred by the director in the individual's
capacity as a director.4 2 While several authors have opined that
such insurance is only available at an exorbitant cost,43 the Aliant"
information circular for the 2002 annual meeting said:
The directors and officers of Aliant and its subsidiaries, benefited from a
group liability insurance in the amount of $280 million (U.S.) purchased
through the BCE group insurance program for the protection of all directors
and officers of BCE and subsidiary corporations against liability incurred by
them in their capacity as directors and officers.
In 2001 the amount of premiums paid by the Aliant group for participating
coverage in respect of directors and officers was $40,300 (U.S.). In a case in
which the corporation is not permitted by law to reimburse the insured, there
is no deductible amount. Where the Corporation is permitted to reimburse the
insured, the deductible is $1 million (U.S.) for the Corporation. 4
Accordingly any outside director can expect to collect a full
indemnity, either from the corporation itself or from the insurer
under the directors' and officers' insurance policy. While there are
provisions in other statutes, such as the Income Tax Act or the
recent revisions to Ontario's Securities Act relating to the liability
39. CBCA, s. 122(1).
40. It may be noted that this type of reliance has been treated by the Supreme Court of
Canada as a bar to any action: see Blair v. Consolidated Enfield, supra, footnote 29.
41. CBCA, s. 124(1).
42. CBCA, s. 124(6). This could cover all duties, including any breach of the duty of loyalty
for which indemnity is not permitted under s. 124(3).
43. K. Ottenbreit and J. Walker, "Learning from the Delaware Experience: A Comparison
of the Canada Business Corporations Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law"
(1998), 29 C.B.L.J. 364 at p. 387, note 78
44. Aliant is a CBCA corporation that resulted from the amalgamation of the telephone
companies operating in the four Atlantic provinces. Bell Canada owns a majority of the
Aliant shares.
45. Aliant, "Notice of Annual and Special Meeting of Shareholders and Information Circu-
lar" dated March 4, 2002 at p. 13. A similar statement is found in the BCE Notice of
2002 Annual and Special Meeting and Management Proxy Circular dated March 30,
2002 at p. 25.
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of directors for misrepresentations, it seems clear that indemnifica-
tion is available.1 Liability problems only arise for outside directors
if the corporation is insolvent." As a corporation drifts toward insol-
vency, directors now seem required to consider the interests of
creditors.48 But as insolvency looms, indemnification vanishes. Di-
rectors will therefore tend to resign or search for some method to
limit liability. One possibility is the charter option provision now
prevalent in the United States.49 This permits firms to obtain charter
amendments that insulate directors from monetary liability for
breaches of the duty of care (but not the fiduciary duty of loyalty).'
While various authors have suggested that Canadian courts are
relatively lenient on directors in duty of care cases,5 1 an absolution
from monetary liability would decrease D&O insurance premiums
and decrease the ever increasing stipends paid to outside directors. 2
Monetary liability on outside directors is a negative force that needs
rethinking.
IV. THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
The CBCA requires every publicly traded corporation to have an
audit committee composed of not less than three directors, a majority
of whom are not officers or employees of the corporation or any of
its affiliates. 3 The Saucier Report requires the audit committee to
be composed solely of outside directors, all of whom should be
"financially literate" and at least one member who has accounting
46. See IX v. Bata Industries Ltd. (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 321, 127 D.L.R. (4th) 438 (C.A.),
which involved two directors of Bata who were convicted of failing to take all reasonable
care to prevent an unlawful discharge of industrial waste. The trial judge levied a fine
on the directors and prohibited indemnification. The Court of Appeal said the corpora-
tion could indemnify the directors. Note also that corporations were held entitled to
deduct fines in computing income for income tax purposes in 65302 British Columbia
Ltd. v. Canada (1999), 179 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804. Employees could not
do so.
47. See Proulx v. Sahelian Goldfields Inc., supra, footnote 35.
48. A. Keay, "The Duty of Directors to Take Account of Creditors' Interests: Has it Any
Role to Play?", [2002] J.B.L. 379; Iacobucci, supra, footnote 5; J.S. Ziegel, "Creditors
as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution - An Anglo-Canadian Perspective"
(1993), 43 U. of T. L.J. 511.
49. Delaware Corporate Law, s. 102(b)(7) is the seminal provision.
50. J. Macey, "Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do a Better Job Than the States in
Regulating Takeovers?" (2002), 57 Bus. L. 1025, at note 52.
51. See for example, Iacobucci, supra, footnote 5, at p. 353.
52. In the January 29, 2003 Globe and Mail, Report on Business, p. 5, Royal Bank of
Canada has increased its annual stipend to outside directors to $100,000: see below.
53. CBCA, S. 171.
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or related financial expertise.54 The basic role of the audit committee
is to ensure that the external auditors are satisfied with the account-
ing estimates and judgments made by management and that these
principles reflect an appropriate application of GAAP. 5 There are
also requirements to oversee the internal audit function, inter alia.
In this article, the focus will be on the central role with the outside
auditor. As a result of the recent regulatory and statutory initiatives,
it appears to be clear that the external auditor's interaction with the
audit committee will increase dramatically. Indeed that committee,
rather than management, will become its primary reporting focus.
The real dilemma facing any audit committee is the enormous
push to continuously show rising market prices for the corpora-
tion's shares, which satisfies every person connected to the corpo-
ration, be they management, investors, stakeholders or exogenous
observers. These prices are seen to depend in large part on the
profits as shown on the income statements released every quarter.
Within the limits of the rules of GAAP, each person connected to the
quarterly financials would like to see rising profits displayed. There
is enormous latitude under accounting rules, in various areas of
income and balance sheet reporting, that can be used to make those
financial statements as positive as possible. So long as there is no
fraud,' the maxim of making the best showing will prevail. There is
little reason for the audit committee to question the financial state-
ments prepared by management if the external auditors confirm that
they properly comply with GAAP. And the statute mandates that the
auditors so confirm when setting out their report.57 To some extent
this seems to make the role of the audit committee redundant, but
the pressure by management on the auditor to put out a "clean"
report may be somewhat tempered by the existence of another layer
of supervision. 8
One problem for the audit committee are the various ways in
which a person is entitled to recognize income and expenses for
54. Saucier Report, supra, footnote 1, at p. 29.
55. Saucier Report, ibid., at p. 31.
56. See R. Sauer, "Financial Statement Fraud: The Boundaries of Liability Under the
Federal Securities Law" (2002), 56 Bus. Lawyer 955.
57. CBCA, s. 169 and Canada Business Corporation Regulations, 2001, SOR/2001-512.
58. The function of the audit committee will involve an enhanced duty of care in order for
the committee to live up to its formal mandate, which is now required. Without a formal
mandate, Canadian outside directors sometimes seem to accept whatever is put before
them by management, see UPM-Kymmene Corp. v. UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc.,
[20021 O.J. No. 2412 (QL), 214 D.L.R. (4th) 496 (S.C.J. (Comm. List)).
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financial statement purposes. Vendor financing is a good example
of increasing revenues by lending the purchaser of equipment the
bulk of the purchase price.59 Until 2001 companies who accounted
for an acquisition by purchase accounting' were required to amor-
tize any goodwill over a maximum of 40 years. This amortization,
which is a charge to expenses, put a large drag on future earnings.
When pooling accounting was outlawed in 2001 a change was made
to amortization of goodwill, so it did not have to be immediately
amortized at all. In fact, if the corporation is doing well, goodwill
will never be amortized. This is an acceptable accounting treatment
to reduce expenses and increase profits, compared with the previous
situation.
Amortization of goodwill, or the lack thereof, is an obvious way
legally to inflate the income statement. And goodwill is only one
sort of amortization. If a company secures a five-year term loan
from a bank at an interest rate of prime plus one, it is common for
the bank to charge a significant initial fee for arranging the loan.
Under accounting rules, that "fee" can be charged to expenses in
the year incurred or it can be amortized over the five-year life of
the loan. Obviously the different allowable techniques of expens-
ing the fee result in different profits for the corporation, yet both
are acceptable.
Accounting rules are not the only culprit. Lawyers often are
able to structure a transaction so that it results in favourable ac-
counting and tax treatment. Consider the use of a SPV to convert
what would otherwise be a secured loan into a "true sale" asset
securitization. Not only does the financial transaction not impact the
liability side of the balance sheet, but there is no interest charge to
expense on the income statement.6" Additionally if a bank is really
the spv, it will not increase its loan exposure as there is no loan in a
true sale transaction. As osFi has approved the use of SPvs for
banks,62 can the audit committee object?63
59. See A. Levitt and P. Dwyer, Take on the Street (New York, Pantheon, 2002), p. 166.
60. In which one allocates the amount paid to the assets acquired and recognizes the excess
as goodwill. This contrasts with pooling accounting where no goodwill is recognized.
See W. Grover and D. Ross, Materials on Corporate Finance (Toronto, De Boo, 1975).
61. Supra, footnote 26.
62. See speech of Mr. N. LePan, October 2002, available on the Office of the Superintendent
of Financial Institutions website, <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca>.
63. In the Telus case, supra, footnote 27, the judge noted that the transaction was very
profitable for Telus and therefore something the board would sanction considering its
fiduciary duty to the corporation. In the 2001 Coca-Cola Annual Report, supra, footnote
21, the MD&A says at p. 59: "The Company does not have transactions, arrangements or
relationships with 'special purpose' entities and the Company does not have any off
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V. REMUNERATION
Remuneration of outside directors is closely tied to accounting
treatment for the corporation and income tax treatment for the
recipient. It is also about to skyrocket as the emphasis on outside
directors increases' and theoretical liability is also increased due to
unfortunate regulatory 65 and legislative changes.' The Royal Bank
of Canada is a good example.
For the year ending October 31, 2002 the annual retainer for an
outside director was $30,000 plus additional amounts for commit-
tee retainers and meeting fees. The non-executive chairman re-
ceived an additional retainer of $250,000. In light of the increased
duties of members of the audit committee, the committee retainer
for audit committee members was doubled in 2003 from $3,000 to
$6,000 for members and to $20,000 from $10,000 for the audit
committee chair. Starting in March 2003, in addition to the annual
board retainer of $30,000 there will be a "dedicated annual board
retainer" of $70,000, bringing the basic total to $100,000. The
$70,000 dedicated retainer will be paid in Director Deferred Stock
Units (DDSU) or in Bank Common Shares. These DDSUS or common
shares must be retained until the director retires. Thus the basic
retainer has jumped from $30,000 to $100,000.
Prior to 2003, the director when newly appointed got options to
purchase shares equal to 6,000 shares and additional options to
purchase 4,000 shares each year. The accounting treatment in 2002
would have shown no expense for the bank in 2002 as a result of
the option grant. If an option for 4,000 shares were exercised on
January 30, 2003, the bank would show an increase in cash on the
balance sheet, and a similar increase against shares outstanding on
the liability side of the balance sheet.
From the individual director's point of view, if an option is
exercised and the shares so acquired are sold, then, for income tax
balance sheet debt." Could this indicate that the Coca-Cola board of directors is not
fulfilling its duty of loyalty?
64. In January 2003 osF put out Corporate Governance Guidelines for federally regulated
financial institutions. It says "Demonstrable board independence is at the core of
effective governance... In selecting board members, the recruitment process and the
development of a director profile should emphasize the independence of board mem-
bers". See <www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca>.
65. This refers to the CSA proposal for secondary market liability, which is now being
advanced into legislation in Ontario.
66. Keeping the Promise for a Strong Economy Act (Budget Measures) 2002, S.O. 2002,
c. 22.
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purposes, 50% of the difference between the sale price and the
exercise price comes into the director's income as employment
income. Thus the director effectively gets a capital gain treatment
on the net proceeds. This makes the option concept very appealing,
although it is only useful if the shares go up in value.
As set out above, Royal Bank this year has discontinued grants
of options for outside directors and has instead instituted an addi-
tional annual board retainer of $70,000, which the director must
receive either in DDSUS or in Bank Common Shares. Each DDSU has
an initial value equal to the market value of a common share at the
time the DDSU is credited to the director. DDSUs attract dividends of
additional DDSUs at the same rate as dividends on Bank Common
Shares. Directors opt whether to choose DDSUS or Bank Common
Shares. In either event, the directors are required to retain the com-
mon shares acquired with the dedicated annual retainer or the DDSUS
until they retire. Upon conversion to cash after retirement the DDSUS
are credited with the market value of the bank shares on the conver-
sion date. Under the Income Tax Regulations67 such deferred com-
pensation will only attract tax when liquidated and there will only
be the 50% inclusion in income like a capital gain. Unlike stock
options, the outside director does not have any downside risk associ-
ated with the DDSU, but its value will vary with the price of the
common shares. Clearly the annual cost to the bank for each outside
director has risen enormously.
VI. INSIDER TRADING
Trading by individuals in the securities of corporations of which
they are directors, senior officers or significant shareholders is
commonly known as insider trading. Often it is seen to be unfair
or offensive if the trading is done when the insider is aware of
undisclosed material information that is likely to impact the market
price of the corporation's stock. The principal basis for the un-
fairness theory is grounded in the concept that the insider has an
informational advantage from which others are excluded and this
advantage is used to the disadvantage of the person on the other
end of the trade.6" It is usually called the equal access theory and is
based on the concept of informational parity. It therefore embraces
67. Income Tax Act, Regulation 6801(d).
68. V. Brudney, "Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal
Securities Laws" (1979), 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322.
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trades by persons other than insiders, such as those who have ob-
tained confidential information from various sources that are not
generally known in the market. The equal access theory was initially
introduced in prosecutions by the SEC under Rule 10(b)-5,69 and it
was followed by the influential Second Circuit 70 until derailed by
the United States Supreme Court in 1980.71 In that case the court
introduced the fiduciary theory, which would only catch trading
transactions where the informed trader owed a pre-existing relation-
ship of trust and confidence to uninformed traders. This concept of
a disclosure duty being dependent on a fiduciary relationship could
extend to reach trading by tippees who, while initially owing no
duty, assumed the tipper's fiduciary duty, but only if the tipper
secures a personal benefit from the tippee. 72 That limiting position
in the United States has effectively slowed insider trading prosecu-
tions by the SEC 73 although Reg FD (fair disclosure) has partly filled
the void.74
It has been said that "insider trading is unfair and immoral, the
economics do not matter, and anyone who says they do is im-
moral".75 If an economic foundation is sought, it should include how
regulation increases welfare and it should be general in the sense
that it can be used in any securities market.76 Some commentators
conclude there is no economic foundation for mandatory insider
regulation.77 Market makers and investors are the prime victims, but
the whole trading history, once disclosed, undermines confidence in
the morality and integrity of financial markets as well as of the
69. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
70. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
71. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In that case the impugned trades were
made by a partner who acquired information from takeover bidders rather than the target
companies.
72. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In that case a former employee exposed a corpora-
tion's ongoing fraud to a security analyst who then informed his clients before knowl-
edge of the fraud became public. See generally R. Kraakman, "The Legal Theory of
Insider Trading Regulation in the United States" in K. Hept and E. Wymeersch, Euro-
pean Insider Dealing (London, Butterworths, 1991).
73. Levitt and Dwyer, supra, footnote 59, at pp. 92-93.
74. Ibid., at pp. 94ff.
75. F Easterbrook, "Insider Trading as an Agency Problem" in J. Pratt and R. Zeckhauser,
eds., Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, Harvard Business
School Press, 1985), p. 83.
76. See H. Schmidt, "Insider Regulation and Economic Theory" in European Insider
Dealing, supra, footnote 72.
77. Ibid.
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public companies involved.7" If this is true, then the public corpora-
tions themselves are in an excellent position to restrict insider trad-
ing.79
In Canada, insider trading 'egulation initially arose from the
Kimber Report8" but has been embedded in the provincial securities
acts8' and the incorporation statutes 82 for several decades. There are
also provisions in the Criminal Code dealing with fraud which
proved to be effective in the early years.83 The focus from a securities
regulation viewpoint in Canada is on the unfairness created in the
market place, which is analogous to the equal access theory rejected
by the United States Supreme Court. However, since the reporting
requirements are limited to insiders as defined, concentration on
these market actors would be a rational use of resources and a policy
that is most likely to pay enforcement and deterrence dividends.'
The problem of enforcement of insider trading liability by the
regulator or by the counter party in the market has proved to be
very difficult. The words in the statute were sometimes the cul-
prit,85 but the evidence suggests that insider trading is pervasive and
the number of cases brought is miniscule.' Insider trading offences
are very difficult to detect. Neither the judiciary nor the trading
public appear to view it as a serious offence. Normally the counter-
party trades in the market without knowing that the trade is with an
insider. And the volume traded by the counterparty is often quite
small. While the corporation in theory can require the insider who
proposes to disgorge the profits, that has not been the reality.
The 2002 Cowpland decision is a case in point. According to an
agreed statement of facts, Cowpland or his holding company sold
shares in August 1997 for $20.4 million when he knew that losses
78. Ibid.
79. H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market (New York, Free Press, 1966), more
recently succinctly set out by the same author in the Wall Street Journal in 2002.
80. Report by the Attorney General's Committee on Securities Regulation in Ontario (March
1965).
81. See for example Ontario's Securities Act, supra, footnote 19, Part XXI.
82. CBCA, Part XI.
83. See R. v. Littler (1974), 65 D.L.R. (3d) 443 and 467, 27 C.C.C. (2d) 216 (Que. C.A.);
D. Johnston, Case Note (1977), 2 C.B.L.J. 234.
84. See S. Beck, "Of Secretaries, Analysts and Printers: Some Reflections on Insider
Trading" (1984), 8 C.B.L.J. 385 at p. 409.
85. The words "make use of" plagued several cases: see Green v. Charterhouse Group,
supra, footnote 17; J. Baillie and V. Alboini, "The National Sea Decision - Exploring
the Parameters of Administrative Discretion" (1978), 2 C.B.L.J. 454.
86. See Beck, supra, footnote 84.
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would be higher than anticipated. The shares fell considerably in
September 1997. He pleaded guilty in criminal court and was fined
$1 million. Before the osc,s7 Cowpland offered to pay another
$500,000 under a settlement agreement worked out with Commis-
sion staff. But the Commission refused to accept the settlement and
said,
[i]llegal insider trading by its very nature is a cancer that erodes public
confidence in the capital markets. It is one of the most serious diseases our
capital markets face. If we do not act in the public interest by sending an
appropriate message in appropriate circumstances, then we fail in doing our
duty .... 88
Now the staff will have to relitigate without any agreed statement
of facts and, given the prior track record, Mr. Cowpland is likely
to win.
There are plenty of ways corporations could regulate their own
insider trading. One could limit trading to buying on good news
and even then set a limit. Selling on bad news could be prohibited.
There is no reason to think Canadian corporations are incapable of
designing workable and acceptable programs of insider trading.
This could be a useful project for outside directors, including
disclosure of the details of the insider trading rules the directors
had adopted. There would not be many cases before the courts but
if there was annual disclosure of all the insider trading and such
trading was shown to be within the rules established by the outside
directors, the osc "cancer" would be cured, or at least be in remis-
sion.
VII. CONCLUSION
The pressure for the boards of Canadian publicly traded corpora-
tions to have more outside directors is increasing. This will result
in significant costs, which should be commensurate with share-
holder expectations, given the increased work quotient and the
potential for increased liability. It is unlikely that the outside direc-
tors will detect fraud or be able to add much to the review of the
financial statements by the external auditor, although having the
auditor report directly to the outside directors would change the
appearance of the auditor reporting mainly to management.
87. In the Matter of M.C.J.C. Holdings Inc. and Michael Cowpland, supra, footnote 16.
88. Ibid.
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Whether the impact is likely to be more cosmetic than substantive
remains to be seen. In the insider information area, however, the
outside directors could perform a valuable function by setting up
rules for insiders buying or selling securities, with a clear disclo-
sure of the results to shareholders in the annual information proxy.
They could also be useful in supervising the disclosure messages in
documents sent to shareholders, other than the extensive disclosure
required by the statutes and the regulators. If legal voting control
rests largely within the management group, it will be difficult for
outside directors to effectively serve investors who have insignifi-
cant voting rights, even if those investors have the major part of
the market capitalization.
